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ABANDONED FROZEN EMBRYOS AND
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH:
SHOULD THERE BE A CONNECTION?
NATALIE R. WALZ*
Abstract
Many couples that have difficulty conceiving a child have turned to the
aid of assisted reproductive technology to try and reproduce. The use of
assisted reproductive technology often provides for the creation of multiple
embryos at one time. The unused embryos are then frozen and stored for
use at a later date. Courts, as well as state governments and the federal
government, have been left to determine what legal principles should
govern the disposition of the frozen embryos, particularly when the couple
fails to enter an agreement or the couple's agreement fails to cover a
contingency that has arisen. The present legal framework provides that
frozen embryos can properly be considered personal property because the
frozen embryos are unique to the individuals and the individuals likely
intend to retain the embryo. Accordingly, a bailment relationship is created
between the couple and the fertility clinic. However, when the bailment
relationship is not established through a disposition agreement, the principle
of abandonment will apply because ownership of the frozen embryo has not
been transferred to another individual. When a frozen embryo has been
abandoned, the fertility clinic may then use the frozen embryo for research
purposes, specifically embryonic stem cell research.
INTRODUCTION
Every year, several million Americans discover that they are infertile.'
Advancements in assisted reproductive technology ("ART") have given
many individuals, who were once unable to reproduce, the chance at
* Attorney, Thomsen & Nybeck, P.A., B.A., cum laude, 2002, University of St. Thomas; J.D.
2005, University of St. Thomas School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful
comments of Professor Teresa S. Collett, Bradley J. Walz, Esq., and Christopher P. Renz, Esq.
1. Daniel I. Steinberg, Divergent Conceptions: Procreational Rights and Disputes Over the
Fate of Frozen Embryos 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 315, 317 (1998).
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procreating. The most widely used method of ART is in vitro fertilization
("IVF").2 Often, couples that use IVF have more embryos than are
necessary for immediate transfer to the woman's uterus and, therefore,
cryopreservation, or freezing, of the embryos is necessary. The process of
freezing the embryos for future use creates a gap between conception and
implantation that leaves room for various contingencies to occur.3 When
couples no longer need or desire to have the frozen embryos transferred to
the woman's uterus, they are often unable to decide what should be done
with the frozen embryos. Accordingly, fertility clinics are holding
approximately 400,000 frozen embryos.4 "In the absence of any consistent,
generalized plan, the embryos will continue to stockpile at the current rate
of 18.8 percent annually."'
The three most prominent alternatives for disposition of the surplus
embryos are destruction, donation for research, or adoption by other
infertile couples.6 Couples that cryopreserve embryos often provide for
their disposition through agreements entered into at the time of the creation
and freezing of the embryos. Each option for disposition of the embryos
raises its own unique issues that a couple must address. Furthermore,
additional issues arise when the couple fails to provide an agreement for the
disposition of their embryos or the agreement is insufficient to cover the
contingency that has arisen.
When failure to provide for the disposition of the embryos occurs,
regardless of the reason the failure occurred, IVF clinics and researchers'
interests in using the embryos for research becomes strong. One of the
reasons researchers are interested in frozen embryos is for the purpose of
conducting embryonic stem cell research. Embryonic stem cell research is
2. See Jill R. Gorny, The Fate of Surplus Cryoperserved Embryos: What is the Superior
Alternative for their Disposition?, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 459, 459 (2004). IVF is a process by
which eggs are extracted from a woman's ovaries and fertilized in a laboratory. The resulting
embryos are then either transferred into a woman's uterus or cryopreserved for future use. Id.
3. Id. at 460.
4. Melinda Troeger, The Legal Status of Frozen Pre-Embryos when a Dispute Arises during
Divorce, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 563, 563 (2003). The figure is based on a survey done
in 2003. Research Brief, How Many Frozen Human Embryos are Available for Research?,
RAND Law & Health (2003). Of the approximately 400,000 frozen embryos, only about 2.8
percent (about 11,000 embryos) have been designated for research, the majority being designated
for future attempts at pregnancy. Id. From the embryos that are designated for research, there is
the possibility that about as many as 275 stem cell lines could be created. Id. However, based on
previous studies, it is estimated that only about 65 percent of the approximately 11,000 embryos
would survive the freeze-and-thaw process, resulting in 7,334 embryos. Id. Of those, about 25
percent (1,834 embryos) would likely be able to survive the initial stages of development to the
blastocyst stage and even a smaller number could successfully be converted into embryonic stem
cell lines. Id. "For example, researchers at the University of Wisconsin needed 18 blastocysts to
create five embryonic stem cell lines, while researchers at The Jones Institute used 40 blastocysts
to create three lines." Id.
5. Gorny, supra note 2, at 460.
6. Id.
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a controversial issue that raises many ethical and legal concerns. One legal
concern is what legal principles should govern the disposition of embryos.
The issue of frozen embryo disposition is a developing area of the law
and, therefore, courts have had little guidance in rendering their decisions. 7
Accordingly, courts have struggled in determining whether privacy rights,
contract rights, or property rights should govern frozen embryo disposition.'
This paper argues that frozen embryos are property and therefore, property
law should govern the disposition of frozen embryos absent an agreement,
or where there is a deficiency in a couple's agreement, with an IVF clinic.
According to property law principles, if the disposition of frozen embryos is
not provided for in an agreement, the frozen embryos should be considered
abandoned and available for use by researchers, including use for
embryonic stem cell research.
Section I of this paper discusses the technology involved in the IVF
process, cryopreservation, and the basics of stem cell research. Section II
addresses the legal framework governing the classification of frozen
embryos, including an analysis of present case law, state and federal
statutes, and the proposed Model Human Reproductive Technologies and
Surrogacy Act. Section I discusses decisional authority over the
disposition of frozen embryos and in whom such authority should vest.
Section IV of this paper addresses the concepts of property law that should
govern the disposition of frozen embryos when there is an absence of an
agreement, or a deficiency in a couple's agreement, specifically the
principles of bailment and abandonment. Finally, Section V discusses the
ethical considerations surrounding the disposition of frozen embryos and
their use for embryonic stem cell research.
I. THE TECHNOLOGY
In the past two decades, thousands of children have been born through
ART, specifically IVF.9 "[T]ens of thousands of frozen embryos annually
are routinely stored in liquid nitrogen canisters, some having been in that
state for more than 10 years with no instructions for their use or disposal. '"'
"Infertility11 is a disease of the reproductive system, in either a male or
7. Elizabeth A. Trainor, Annotation, Right of Husband, Wife, or Other Party to Custody of
Frozen Embryo, Pre-embryo, or Pre-zygote in Event of Divorce, Death, or Other Circumstances,
87 A.L.R. 5TH 253 (2001-2004).
8. Id.
9. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y., 1998).
10. Id.
11. Georgia Reproductive Specialists, Overview of Infertility, http://www.ivf.com/fert
overview.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Overview of Infertility] ("Infertility is the
inability to conceive after one year of trying with unprotected intercourse for couples in which the
female is under 35 and six months of trying for couples in which the female is over 35.").
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a female, that inhibits the ability to conceive and deliver a child. '"'2
Approximately one in five couples is infertile in the United States and there
are a number of factors, both male and female, that can cause the
condition. 3 "Many couples faced with infertility are still unable to become
pregnant after first line therapy such as ovulation induction, intrauterine
insemination, or reproductive surgery. For these couples, the logical next
step is to explore ... ART."' 14
The most common form of ART is IVF.'5 IVF begins with the
hormonal stimulation of a woman's ovaries to produce multiple eggs.' 6 The
eggs are then retrieved by laparoscopy or an ultrasound-guided needle
aspiration.' 7 Once removed, the eggs are placed in a glass dish where a
man's sperm is introduced.' 8 When the egg is fertilized, the pre-zygote
divides until it reaches the four to eight cell stage.'9 The woman then either
returns about three days later to have the embryos transferred to her uterus
or the embryos are cryopreserved.2°
Cryopreservation is the "[m]aintenance of the viability of excised
tissues or organs at extremely low temperatures."'" It is a technique that
allows embryos to be frozen and stored for later uses. An embryo is
cryopreserved by using controlled-rate freezing which slowly cools the
embryos in cryoprotectant fluid, an anti-freezing solution, from a person's
body temperature down to negative 196'C.23 Once frozen, the embryos
12. Id.
13. Donna M. Sheinbach, Comment, Examining Disputes Over Ownership Rights to Frozen
Embryos: Will Prior Consent Documents Survive if Challenged by State Law and/or
Constitutional Principles?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 989, 989 (Spring 1999); Overview of Infertility,
supra note 11.
14. Georgia Reproductive Specialists, The IVF Program, http://www.ivf.com/ivfprogram
.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
For further information on ovulation induction, see Georgia Reproductive Specialists, Ovulation
Induction, http://www.ivf.com/ovind.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007) ("Ovulation induction
medications, often referred to as fertility drugs, are used to stimulate the follicles [in a woman's]
ovaries resulting in the production of multiple eggs in one cycle.").
For further information on intrauterine insemination, see Georgia Reproductive Specialists,
Intrauterine Insemination, http://www.ivf.com/iui.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007) ("Intrauterine
insemination (1UI) is a procedure in which sperm are placed directly into the uterine cavity
through a catheter near the time of ovulation.").
15. Dr. Sherman J. Silber, The Infertility Center of St. Louis, IVF,
http://www.infertile.com/treatmnt/treats/ivf.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
16. Trainor, supra note 7, § 2[a].
17. Id.; Silber, supra note 15.
18. Trainor, supra note 7.
19. Id.
20. Silber, supra note 15.
21. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 375 (25th ed. 1990).
22. Paula Walter, His, Hers, or Theirs - Custody, Control, and Contracts: Allocating
Decisional Authority Over Frozen Embryos, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 938 (1999).
23. Georgia Reproductive Specialists, Human Embryo Cryopreservation, http://www.ivf
.com/cryo.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
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"are placed inside labeled tubes attached to aluminum canes and stored in
numbered" containers of liquid nitrogen called dewars.24
Couples that choose to have their embryos frozen have four basic
options for disposition of the frozen embryos: "(1) they can donate the
embryos for research, (2) they can have the embryos destroyed, (3) they can
keep the embryos frozen, or (4) they can give the embryos anonymously to
another couple. '25 Typically, IVF clinics will enter into an agreement with
the couple that sets forth the rights of the donors and the couple's decision
regarding disposition of any unused frozen embryos.26 The agreement
usually also provides what events, such as death, divorce, refusal to
continue with the program, or termination of the agreement, will trigger the
disposition selected by the couple.27
If a couple decides to donate their embryos for research, the embryos
that are donated are typically the ones that have been cryopreserved.
Researchers are able to use the cryopreserved embryo for stem cell
research. A stem cell is a cell that has the ability to self-replicate for long
periods by the process of cell division.28 Under certain physiologic
conditions, or if given the right signals, stem cells have the ability to
become mature cells that possess characteristic shapes and specialized
functions of cells that make up organs in the human body (e.g., heart cells,
skin cells, or nerve cells).29 There are two types of stem cells that scientists
work with the most: adult stem cells3" and embryonic stem cells.31
However, regardless of their source, all stems cells "are capable of dividing
24. Id.
25. Heidi Forster, The Legal and Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and Destruction of
Frozen Human Embryos: A Reaction to the Mass Disposal in Britain and the Lack of Law in the
United States, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 759, 760 (Summer 1998).
26. Walter, supra note 22, at 938.
27. Id. at 938-39.
28. Terese Winslow, National Institutes of Health, Stem Cells: Scientific Progress and
Future Research Directions, June 2001, http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/scireport
/PDFs/fullrptstem.pdf (last visited March 7, 2007).
29. Id.
30. Id.; "An adult stem cell is an undifferentiated cell found among differentiated cells in a
tissue or organ." The National Institutes of Health, Stem Cell Basics, http://stemcells
.nih.gov/info/basics/basics4.asp (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). The origin of an adult stem cell in
mature tissue is unknown. Id. The purpose of adult stem cells is to maintain homeostasis, a
steady state of functioning, within a cell and to replace cells that die because of injury or disease.
Id. Therefore, adult stem cells behave differently depending on where they are located in a
person's body and are unipotent, "capable of differentiating along only one lineage." Id. At this
point in time, there are no isolated adult stem cells that are capable of forming all cells of the
body, unlike embryonic stem cells. Id.
31. National Institutes of Health, Stem Cell Basics, http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics
/basics3.asp (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). Stem cells can also be derived from the fetal tissue of an
aborted fetus, called embryo germ cell stem cells. Audrey R. Chapman, et al., American
Association for the Advancement of Science and the Institute for Civil Society, Stem Cell
Research and Applications: Monitoring the Frontiers of Biomedical Research, 1, 12,
http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/projects/stem/report.pdf (November 1999).
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and renewing themselves for long periods[,] they are unspecialized[,] and
they can give rise to specialized cell types. 32
Embryonic stems cells derive from the blastocyst stage of the embryo.33
A fertilized egg is totipotent, meaning entire, "because it has the potential to
generate all the cells and tissue that make up an embryo and that support its
development in utero ... until it produces a mature organism."34 The three
embryonic germ layers, the mesoderm, endoderm, and ectoderm, are the
embryonic source of all the specialized cells of the body.35 Stem cells that
give rise to cells derived from all three embryonic germ layers are called
pluripotent.36 "Embryonic cells hold as much promise as they do because
they have not yet differentiated and are accordingly capable of becoming
any kind of cell in the human body. 37
Many potential uses for embryonic stem cells have been proposed, such
as their use in transplant therapy for certain diseases (e.g., Parkinson's
disease, diabetes, traumatic spinal cord injury, heart failure, Duchenne's
muscular dystrophy), to study events in early human development and
chromosomal abnormalities, to test candidate therapeutic drugs, to screen
potential toxins, and to develop new methods for genetic engineering.38
However, presently embryonic stem cells have not been actually used for
the aforementioned purposes.3 9
As researchers continue to discover different ways in which embryonic
stem cell research may benefit others, courts, state governments, and the
federal government are also attempting to determine what legal principles
32. National Institutes of Health, Stem Cell Basics, http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics
/basics2.asp (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). "When cells replicate themselves many times over it is
called proliferation." Other cells in a person's body, such as nerve cells, are not capable of
proliferation.
A stem cell does not have any tissue-specific structures that allow it to perform specialized
functions; a stem cell cannot work with surrounding nerve cells which are capable themselves of
firing electrochemical signals to other cells to make a person's body move or speak. Id
"When unspecialized stem cells give rise to specialized cells, the process is called differentiation."
Many questions about cell differentiation still exist, but it has typically been seen that adult stem
cells generate the cell types of the tissue that they are in. Id.
33. Committee on the Biological and Biomedical Applications of Stem Cell Research et al.,
STEM CELLS AND THE FUTURE OF REGENERATIVE MEDICINE 31 (Nat'l Acad. Press 2002); "The
blastocyst is the stage of embryonic development prior to implantation in the uterine wall."
Winslow, supra note 28, at 5; Embryonic stem cells are not derived from an egg that has been
fertilized in a woman's body, but rather are derived from embryos that have been developed for
the purpose of in vitro fertilization. National Institutes of Health, supra note 32.
34. Winslow, supra note 28, at 1.
35. Id.
36. Id. (Pluripotent cells have the ability to give rise to any type of cell).
37. Sherry F. Colb, FindLaw, Stem Cells, Life, and The President's First Veto, July 26, 2006,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20060726.html (last visited March 11, 2007).
38. Winslow, supra note 28, at 15-17.
39. President George W. Bush, The White House - Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, Aug. 9, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001
/08/print/20010809-1 .html (last visited March 11, 2007).
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are appropriate to address this novel, but expanding, area of research.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING THE CLASSIFICATION
OF FROZEN EMBRYOS
"As science races ahead, it leaves in its trail mind-numbing ethical and
legal questions."'  Courts have been provided little guidance in
determining what principles of law should govern the classification of
frozen embryos.4' There is no federal law governing the classification of
frozen embryos and "[o]nly three states have enacted legislation concerning
the disposition of frozen embryos:" Louisiana, Florida, and New
Hampshire. 2 Each of these state statutes reaches a different conclusion as
to the classification of frozen embryos. Law students from the University
of Iowa Law School drafted a Model Act regarding the classification and
disposition of frozen embryos; however, no state has adopted the Model
Act. Of the few courts that have addressed the issue of the classification of
frozen embryos, no consensus has been reached. Presently, the legal
framework that exists for the classification of frozen embryos is to either
afford the frozen embryos privacy rights by attributing to them a special
status, consider the frozen embryos a matter to be governed by the
principles of contract law,43 or to give the frozen embryos the status of
property.44
A. FROZEN EMBRYOS AS THE SUBJECT OF PRIVACY RIGHTS
An individual's right to privacy is not specifically enumerated in the
United States Constitution or any state constitution." However, an
individual's right to privacy developed in order to "protect individuals from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters such as . . . [those]
involving intimate questions of personal and family concern. Courts
40. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178.
41. Trainor, supra note 7.
42. Id. None of these state courts have specifically addressed the issue of embryo disposition
under these statutes. New Hampshire's statutes regarding disposition of embryos focus less on the
characterization of the embryo and more on the restrictions of the embryo's use. See N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 168-B: 13-15, 168-B.18 (2006). The New Hampshire statutes require that an embryo
needs to be cryopreserved within 14 days of post-fertilization and, if an embryo has been donated
for research, it cannot subsequently be transferred to a woman's uterus. Id. Couples are also
required to undergo medical evaluations and counseling. Id.
43. See Del Zio v. Columbia Presbyterian Hosp., No. 74-3558, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14450, at *1, *18-*19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978) (denying plaintiffs damages for conversion claim
of deliberate destruction of sole embryo, but awarding damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
44. Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 359, 414 (April
2000).
45. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992).
46. Id. at 600.
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have found that a fundamental attribute of the right to privacy is
procreational autonomy and, therefore, some courts have held that privacy
rights should govern the disposition of frozen embryos.47
The issue before the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis" was
"whether a divorced woman could use the frozen embryos that she and her
husband created [during their marriage] either to become pregnant or to
donate to another couple"49 in the absence of an agreement between her and
her ex-husband regarding the disposition of the frozen embryos.5 ° Because
there was no agreement, the Davis court based its decision on an
individual's right to privacy, namely, the right to procreate and the right to
avoid procreation.5 Accordingly, the Davis court held that, based on the
facts of the instant case, the ex-husband's interest in not having children
that would not live with both biological parents was greater than his ex-
wife's interest in donating the frozen embryos.52 For those reasons, the
Davis court awarded custody of the frozen embryos to the ex-husband.53
In reaching its decision to dispose of the frozen embryos according to
an individual's privacy rights, the Davis court also addressed whether the
frozen embryos should be classified as a "person" or "property," or instead
whether disposition of the frozen embryos should be governed by contract
principles.54 In examining whether a frozen embryo should be viewed as a
person, the Davis court relied on Tennessee's Wrongful Death Act.55
Tennessee's Wrongful Death Act does not recognize a fetus as a person,
and, therefore, the Davis court concluded that a frozen embryo could not be
recognized as a person.56 In addressing whether the frozen embryo should
be considered property, the Davis court rejected the intermediate appellate
court's reliance on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in holding that frozen
47. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715 (N.J. 2001).
48. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
49. Forster, supra note 25, at 769; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
50. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
51. Id. at 598, 600-01, 603. The United States Supreme Court in Eisenstadt, stated: "If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(emphasis in original). See also Carey v. Population Serv's Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)
(finding decision whether to bear or beget child fundamental to individual autonomy); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding statute authorizing sterilization of certain criminals
invalid because right to procreate a basic civil right of man).
52. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (The Davis court noted, however, that one progenitor's desire
to avoid procreation does not create an "automatic veto" regarding the other progenitor's desire to
utilize the frozen embryos. The parties' interests in using and not using the frozen embryos must
be weighed).
53. Id.
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embryos are property.57 The Davis court found that frozen embryos are
different than other human organs and tissue governed by the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act because they hold the potential for developing into
independent human life.58 However, the Davis court also found that frozen
embryos belong in an interim category, entitled to special respect, because
of their potential for human life.59 Therefore, according to the Davis court,
while the frozen embryos were not persons under the law and the
progenitors did not have a true property interest in the frozen embryos, the
progenitors did have decision-making authority concerning the disposition
of the frozen embryos.'
Accordingly, the Davis court discussed whether contract law should
govern frozen embryo disposition.61 The Davis court stated that agreements
between a couple and an 1VF clinic regarding the disposition of
untransferred frozen embryos in the event of contingencies should be
presumed valid and enforceable.6" Further, no other individual or entity
other than the progenitors should have decision-making authority over the
frozen embryos because he/she/it does not bear the consequences of the
decisions in the same way the progenitors do.63 Therefore, had a contract
existed between the parties in Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court
suggests that the contract would have governed disposition of the frozen
embryos.
B. FROZEN EMBRYO AS A PERSON
In Miller v. American Infertility Group, the couple alleged that their
IVF treatment from a fertility clinic produced nine viable embryos that were
to be frozen and stored for later implantation in the woman's uterus.' They
further alleged that at least one of the embryos developed into a blastocyst
and that an employee or agent of the fertility clinic wrongfully destroyed
the embryo.65 The couple sued the fertility clinic under Illinois' Wrongful
Death Act.66
The Miller court held that an embryo is a human being within the
57. Id. at 595-96.
58. Id. at 596.
59. Id. at 597.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 597-98.
62. Id. at 597 (The court further stated that the progenitor's initial agreement regarding
disposition of the frozen embryos may later be modified by agreement in order to allow for future
life changes between the progenitors. However, absent an agreed modification, the initial
disposition agreement is binding).
63. Id. at 602.
64. Court File No. 02 L 7394, 1 (Ii. Cir. Cook 2005).
65. Id. at pg. 1-2.
66. Id. at pg. 1.
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meaning of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act.67 The Wrongful Death Act
does not define the meaning of a human being.68 However, the Miller court
stated that in order to be consistent with Illinois' Abortion Law, which
states that life begins at conception, the definition of a human being in the
Wrongful Death Act should be the same.69 "Philosophers and theologians
may debate, but there is no doubt in the mind of the Illinois Legislature
when life begins. It begins at conception."7 °
The Miller court did not specifically address the issue of frozen embryo
disposition and Illinois does not have a statute specifically addressing the
disposition of frozen embryos. However, it can be inferred from the Miller
court's willingness to develop a consistent definition throughout its laws of
what constitutes a human being, that if faced with the issue of whether a
frozen embryo can be discarded or donated for research, Illinois courts will
hold that such disposition is in opposition to the rights given born human
beings and, therefore, in violation of the law.
Louisiana's statute regarding disposition of embryos is in accordance
with the Miller court's finding that an embryo deserves special status. In
Louisiana, by statute, an embryo is given the status of a juridical person7"
and, therefore, cannot be produced solely for research purposes72 and cannot
be intentionally destroyed.73 The embryo is not considered the property of
the IVF clinic or the physician. If the identity of the individuals who
donated the gametes to produce the embryo is not known, the IVF clinic or
the physician is considered a temporary guardian of the embryo until
adoptive implantation can occur. "
C. CONTRACTS BETWEEN PROGENITORS GOVERNING FROZEN EMBRYOS
75
"Our legal system places great weight on assuring that contracts will be
enforced as written. Private agreements allow the parties to specify the
terms of their interaction with a degree of detail statutory law could never
supply; they also allow parties to negotiate around the uncertainty created
67. Id. at pg. 6.
68. Id. at pg. 4-6.
69. Id.
70. Id. at pg. 6.
71. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:124 (1991).
72. Id. § 9:122
73. Id. § 9:129
74. Id. § 9:126
75. Litowitz addressed cryopreservation agreements between parties where only one of the
parties is a progenitor. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002). The court in Litowitz
found that the non-progenitor's claim of right to any of the frozen embryos rested solely in
contract and, therefore, the court based its decision on the contractual rights of the parties under
the cryopreservation agreement. Id. at 270-71. Accordingly, the court deemed it unnecessary to
engage in a discussion regarding whether the frozen embryos should be considered "persons." id.
at 271.
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by new developments, changing mores, or conflicting legal
interpretations."76 However, despite the weight our legal system puts in
contracts, contracts have never been untouchable.77 Contracts between
family members "have been suspect altogether." " But some courts have
held that contracts, which in this instance are typically between family
members, should govern the disposition of frozen embryos.
In Kass, five embryos that were created during the couple's marriage
were being stored at an IVF bank.79 The couple subsequently divorced and
a dispute pertaining to the custody of the frozen embryos arose.80 Ms. Kass
argued that she should have sole custody over the embryos because the
embryos were her last opportunity to have biological children.81 Mr. Kass
argued that Ms. Kass should not have custody of the embryos because
unwanted fatherhood should not be imposed on him unilaterally.82 The
informed consent form signed between the parties authorized retrieval of
the eggs, the cryopreservation of the unused eggs, and the donation of the
unused embryos to the IVF clinic for research should a dispute about
disposition of the unused embryos arise.83
The New York Court of Appeals, as opposed to the Tennessee Supreme
Court in Davis, held that the disposition of frozen embryos does not trigger
an individual's right to privacy, but rather, the mutual intent of the parties,
as evidenced through the disposition agreement, should control.84 In Kass,
that meant donation to the IVF clinic for research.8" The Kass court
reasoned that "[a]greements between progenitors, or gamete donors,
regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed
valid and binding and enforced in any dispute between them."86 The Kass
court noted that it is better for the progenitors, not the states or the courts, to
make such an important life decision.87
In reaching its decision in Kass, the New York Court of Appeals did not
affirmatively hold that frozen embryos should be considered property, but it
did suggest a similarity to property law with the progenitors holding a
bundle of rights in the embryos that can be exercised through joint
76. Howard Fink & June Carbone, Between Private Ordering and Public Fiat: A New
Paradigm for Family Law Decision-Making, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 6 (2003).
77. Id. at 6-7.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 177-78.
83. Id. at 176-77.
84. Id. at 179, 181. The court also summarily dismissed any notion that the frozen embryos
should be considered "persons." Id. at 179.
85. Id. at 181.
86. Id. at 180.
87. Id.
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disposition contracts.8"
Despite the Davis and Kass courts' seeming approval of frozen embryo
disposition contracts, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in A.Z. v. B.Z.
showed disfavor of frozen embryo disposition contracts and refused to
enforce the couple's agreement when the agreement infringed on an
individual's privacy right to decide whether to enter a familial
relationship.89 In A.Z. v. B.Z., a couple underwent multiple IVF treatments
over the course of a 17-year marriage from which some embryos were
cryopreserved.9 ° The husband and wife both signed consent forms for each
procedure detailing their instructions for disposition of the frozen embryos
in the event of separation. 91 The consent form gave the wife use of the
frozen embryos for implantation upon separation.9" However, the husband
and wife allegedly signed the consent form out of the presence of each
other, with only the wife completing the disposition language. 93 After the
separation, the wife wanted to thaw and implant the embryos for her own
use and the husband sought an injunction to prevent her from doing SO. 9 4
This was the first reported case regarding the disposition of frozen
embryos where a consent form signed between the couple and the IVF
clinic provided that upon separation of the couple, the frozen embryos were
to be given to one of the donors for implantation.95 The A.Z. court found
numerous reasons rendering the agreement between the couple
unenforceable.
First, the A.Z. court found that the frozen embryo disposition agreement
was not intended as a binding agreement between the husband and wife
should they later disagree as to the disposition of the frozen embryos, but
rather was intended only to define the donors' relationship as a unit with the
clinic. 96 Second, the agreement did not contain a time period and the
circumstances under which the agreement was executed had changed, and,
therefore, the A.Z. court refused to assume that the couple intended the
agreement to apply absent any evidence of agreement on the time duration
of the consent form. 97 Finally, the consent form used the phrase, "[s]hould
we become separated" without defining separation.98 Because the dispute
88. Id. at 179.
89. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
90. Id. at 1053.
91. Id. at 1053-1054
92. Id. at 1054.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1055.
95. Id. at 1056.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1057 (enforcement of the consent form was sought four years after it had been
executed).
98. Id. at 1057 (the A.Z. court noted that "separation" and "divorce" have distinct legal
meanings).
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arose in the context of a divorce, the A.Z. court found that it could not
conclude that the consent form was to govern under these circumstances. 99
However, the A.Z. court stated that even if the agreement between the
parties was unambiguous and enforceable, it would refuse to enforce an
agreement that imposed parenthood on someone who was unwilling to be a
parent."° "As a matter of public policy, ... forced procreation is not an
area amenable to judicial enforcement." '°' The A.Z. court reasoned an
individual's liberty and privacy rights require that no individual should be
compelled to enter into intimate familial relationships.'02
The issues surrounding the enforceability of frozen embryo disposition
agreements were further compounded in J.B. v. M.B. 103 In J.B. v. M.B., the
agreement between the couple stated that the control and disposition of their
frozen embryos belonged to the "Patient and her Partner."' ' 4  It stated
further that the couple agreed that all control, direction, and ownership of
their tissues would be relinquished to the IVF Program upon dissolution of
their marriage by court order, unless the court was to specify otherwise.'0°
Upon dissolution of their marriage, the wife sought destruction of the
frozen embryos while the husband wanted to preserve the frozen embryos
either for his use with another woman or for donation to another couple.' °6
The J.B. court found in favor of the wife reasoning that the language of
the disposition agreement did not indicate a clear intent of the parties, and,
therefore, because no contract existed, generally the party opposing
reproduction will prevail. 7 However, the J.B. court recognized the need
for agreements between progenitors and IVF clinics that perform the
procedures and, therefore, held that it would enforce "agreements entered
into at the time [IVF has] begun, subject to the right of either party to
change his or her mind about disposition up to the point of use or
destruction of any stored [embryos]."'0 8
The J.B. court supported its holding by reasoning that the rule it set
forth will permit either progenitor to object to the disposition of the frozen
99. Id.
100. Id. "The Legislature has already determined by statute that individuals should not be
bound by certain agreements binding them to enter or not enter into familial relationships." Id. at
1058; see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207, § 47A (2004) (abolishing statute regarding cause of action for
breach of promise to marry); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210, § 2 (2004) (providing mother cannot agree
to surrender child to adoptive parents sooner than fourth calendar day after child's birth regardless
of any prior agreement).
101. Id. at 1057-58.
102. Id. at 1059.
103. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
104. Id. at 709-10.
105. Id. at 710.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 713-14,716.
108. Id. at719.
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embryo at a later date thereby protecting "[t]he public policy concerns that
underlie limitations on contracts involving family relationships."1 9
Recognizing that this rule provides a conditional nature to disposition
agreements, making them susceptible to litigation, the J.B. court opined that
it believed the agreements in a large majority of the cases would control. 110
Moreover, should disputes regarding the agreements later arise, the J.B.
court commented that its stated position that ordinarily the progenitor
choosing not to become a parent will prevail would also reduce further
litigation. ''
The Florida statute governing disposition of frozen embryos is in
accordance with the line of cases that conclude that frozen embryo
disposition should be governed by contractual agreements. The statute
governing the disposition of frozen embryos in Florida requires the couple
and the IVF clinic or physician to enter into a written dispositional
agreement regarding the embryos. 12 Absent a written agreement, control
and decision-making authority over the disposition of the frozen embryos
remains with the couple." 3 Thus, Florida places emphasis on determining
the disposition of frozen embryos according to the couple's wishes.
Therefore, it appears that "[t]he easiest way to reconcile the decisions
[regarding frozen embryo disposition agreements] is to conclude that the
courts will enforce such agreements where they provide for the donation or
destruction of the frozen genetic material, but not where they provide for
the implantation of the embryos over the objection of one of the parties..'' 4
D. FROZEN EMBRYOS AS PROPERTY
According to the United States Constitution, "no person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" and
private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just
compensation.""' 5  Every individual has a constitutional right to not be
deprived of property without notice and the following of proper
procedures." 6 If property is taken from an individual without due process
of law, the deprivation must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state




112. Fla. Stat. § 742.17 (1997).
113. Id. at § 742.17(1)-(3).
114. Fink, supra note 76, at 67.
115. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
116. Rao, supra note 44, at 368.
117. Id.
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without payment of just compensation." 8  The Constitution does not,
however, define what constitutes property and, therefore, there is no bright-
line rule regarding whether an individual's body parts falls within the
property protections granted by the United States Constitution. "9
Accordingly, courts have looked to federal and state statutes, as well as
common law, to determine whether an individual's body parts qualify as
property and, thus, are protected by the United States Constitution.
Property is traditionally characterized as:
a bundle of rights possessed by persons relative to objects,
including, inter alia, the right to possess one's property, the right to
use it, the right to exclude others, the right to transfer ownership by
gift or by sale, the right to dispose of one's property after death, and
the right not to have one's property expropriated by the government
without payment of compensation.120
Courts have held that some human body parts, such as blood, should be
recognized as property.' 2' Those human body parts are presently given
property status under the law and, consequently, individuals are given
property rights in them.' 22 However, courts have not afforded all body parts
property status and the attendant rights that go along with such status.
Therefore, the question becomes whether it is proper to classify frozen
embryos as personal property.' 23
The discussion in Moore v. Regents of the University of California 4
regarding property rights in human tissue, while not directly addressing the
issue of embryos and whether they should be classified as property, has
potential implications for classifying embryos as property.' 25  In Moore,
doctors at the Medical Center of the University of California at Los Angeles
removed Moore's spleen, with his written consent, as treatment for hairy-
cell leukemia.'26 Upon removal of his spleen, the doctors discovered that
his tissue had a possibility of creating special disease and cancer fighting
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 369.
121. Id. at 371-73; see Green v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1234-35 (1980) (holding no reason to
distinguish petitioner's sale of blood plasma on a regular basis for profit from sale of other goods,
such as eggs, milk, and honey, therefore regarding it as taxable income, but failing to hold whole
body as property).
122. Rao, supra note 44, at 371.
123. Lynne M. Thomas, Abandoned Frozen Embryos and Texas Law of Abandoned Personal
Property: Should there be a Connection? 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 255, 298 (1997) (Personal property
is traditionally defined as anything that is the subject of ownership that is not real property.
Personal property is broken into two parts: (1) Corporeal - tangible items, such as, animals,
furniture, or merchandise, and (2) Incorporeal - intangible items that are subject to ownership,
such as, intellectual property or stocks.).
124. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
125. Thomas, supra note 123, at 281.
126. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
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pharmaceutical products. 127  The doctors proceeded to develop these
products, which eventually led to their financial gain. 28  However, the
doctors failed to obtain Moore's consent to use his tissue in this manner. 29
The California Supreme Court allowed Moore's tort claims for breach
of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent but denied his claim for
conversion of property. 3° In denying Moore's claim for conversion, the
Moore court rejected his argument that he "continued to own his cells
following their removal from his body, at least for the purpose of directing
their use . ... ,13' The Moore court reasoned that in order to establish
conversion, a person must have title to the property and expect to retain its
possession,"' Moore did not expect to retain possession of his spleen after
it had been removed, which was enough to negate his ownership interest in
his spleen and cells.'33 Further, the Moore court found that Moore's cells
were not unique to him because they did not carry a genetic code or other
mark only found in his body.'34 Therefore, there was nothing unique to
establish these cells as Moore's property. 135
Moore does not, however, stand for the proposition that an individual's
human tissue can never be viewed as property. 136 There are three possible
constructions of the holding in Moore: (1) body parts cannot be seen as
property while they are contained in the human body, but can be given
property rights once they are removed, (2) that body parts are property but,
once removed, were abandoned by the owner because they had little value
to the owner and, therefore, are capable of appropriation, or (3) body parts,
once removed from the owner, become part of the public domain and
communal property.'37
Moore's holding, when applied to cryopreservation of embryos, appears
to support a finding that frozen embryos may be properly classified as
property.'38  "[E]mbryos are incredibly unique human tissue."'39  An
embryo carries its own genetic characteristics that cannot be replicated in




130. Id. at 479-97.
131. Id. at487.
132. Id. at 488-89.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 490, nn.29-30.
135. Id. at 492 (cells could not be scientifically linked to any one individual, id. at 490, and
every human has an identical molecular structure).
136. Rao, supra note 44, at 374.
137. Id. at 374-75.
138. Thomas, supra note 123, at 282.
139. Id. at 283.
140. Id.
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only one man and one woman.' 4 ' It is more reasonable to conclude that a
person seeks to retain possession of an embryo once the necessary
components are removed from an individual's body because the main
purpose of IVF, and further cryopreservation, is the creation of the embryos
for later use.'42 Furthermore, state statutes addressing the issue of excised
human tissue directed the court's decision in Moore.'43 Accordingly, absent
a state statute directing the court on the control and disposition of frozen
embryos, the law of personal property should apply.'"
In York v. Jones, the United States District Court of the Eastern District
of Virginia specifically addressed the issue of whether frozen embryos can
properly be classified as personal property.'45 In York, a couple who had
cryopreserved their embryos with the Jones Institute in Virginia
subsequently moved to California and wanted their frozen embryos
transferred so implantation could be done there.'46 The Jones Institute
refused claiming that the couple's contract for disposition of the frozen
embryos did not include transfer as an option for disposition.'47 The
Virginia court, however, recognized that the couple had a property interest
in their frozen embryos based on the contract they entered into prior to the
cryopreservation of their embryos.'48 The York court found that the
disposition contract constituted a bailment contract, 149 therefore, limiting
the Jones Institute's control and dominion it could exercise over the
disposition of the frozen embryos as a bailee. 5 ° The Jones Institute needed
to release the frozen embryos to the control of the couple when they so
demanded. '
The culmination of these opinions from varying courts, as well as the
different state statutes, suggests that frozen embryos should be considered
property because of their unique characteristics and an individual's likely
intent to retain possession of a frozen embryo. Because a frozen embryo
can properly be characterized as property, the couple should have the ability
to enter into an enforceable contract between themselves and the IVF clinic
regarding disposition of their property.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 284.
144. Id.
145. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
146. Id. at 424.
147. Id. at 424-25.
148. Id. at 425. The York court further based its holding on a violation of the couple's
constitutional right to procreation freedom, holding that the Jones Institute was not an arm of the
Commonwealth of Virginia and thus could not claim governmental immunity from liability. Id. at
429.
149. See infra § IV.
150. York, 717 F. Supp. at 425, 427.
151. Id. at425.
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E. MODEL HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND SURROGACY ACT
"There is no federal law providing uniformity with respect to disputes
over embryo ownership."' 2 However, students at the University of Iowa
Law School drafted a Model Human Reproductive Technologies and
Surrogacy Act ("Model Act"). 3 The Model Act proposes the same
restrictions on the use of embryos as the New Hampshire statute.'54 It
further provides that no one other than the donor has rights in the frozen
embryo,'55 with the exception of transfer by the donor to a licensed
person. 156
The Model Act provides that absent a written agreement to the contrary
retaining such rights, the transfer of frozen embryos to a licensed person
transfers with it all the rights of the donor. 57 It states that the man and
woman who provide the gametes to create the embryo shall each have the
same rights with respect to the embryo." 8 However, should the gamete
provider's interests conflict, and the parties did not contract as to whose
interests should control, the Model Act provides a default priority list of
whose interest should prevail:
(1) First, rights of a sperm donor who had retained rights with
respect to his sperm, or the rights of the sperm donor's spouse. (2)
Second, rights of an ovum donor who had retained rights with
respect to her ovum, or the rights of the ovum donor's spouse. (3)
Third, rights of a licensed person who had rights with respect to the
ovum. (4) Fourth, rights of a licensed person who had rights with
respect to the sperm. 59
As the comment to this section of the Model Act suggests, this means
that when a conflict arises between a man and a woman regarding the
disposition of their frozen embryos, the man's interests will prevail if he
retained his rights with respect to his sperm. 60 The drafters of the Model
Act attempt to explain this preference to the sperm donor's interests over
the egg donor's interests by claiming that such preference will minimize the
potential harm to any resulting child or, in some cases, "eliminating the
possibility that a child could be born to the couple at all.''. The drafters
152. Trainor, supra note 7.
153. Jeffrey Abbas et al., Model Human Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy Act, 72
IOWA L. REv. 943 (1987).
154. Id. at § 9-103; see supra note 42.
155. Id. at § 9-104.
156. Id. at § 9-105 (1987). "A licensed person means a person licensed or authorized by the
State Department of Health . . . to engage in the collection, storage, or use of gametes and
[embryos]." Id. at § 1-102(9).
157. Id. at §§ 9-106(a)--(b).
158. Id. at § 9-106(e).
159. Id. at § 9 -106(e)(l)-(4).
160. Id. at § 9-106(e) cmt.
161. Id.
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believe this prioritization will minimize the chance that a sperm donor who
does not consent to the use of the frozen embryo will be determined the
father of any resulting child, which would be possible if the egg donor
controlled the disposition of the frozen embryo.'62
The proposed Model Act is consistent with the concept of viewing
embryos as a form of property, for which the proper disposition and transfer
of rights and ownership can be contracted for between the parties. The
Model Act also attempts to provide a resolution to the issue of how courts
should decide whose interests control absent a disposition agreement or
when the disposition agreement fails to provide for proper disposition of the
embryos. The proposed priority listing, however, is inconsistent with
applicable property law and, therefore, should not govern when conflict
between the parties arises.'63
While a statute does not need to be consistent with common law in
order to be valid, and, in fact, many statutes are enacted to circumvent
common law, the proposed priority listing of the Model Act fails to give the
courts any discretion in determining whose interests should be controlling.
A bright-line rule, while easy to apply and giving predictability to the law,
is not always appropriate. The issue of frozen embryo disposition is usually
susceptible to many competing interests and the decision can have
significant affects on the parties involved. Therefore, the courts should
view the priority listing provided by the Model Act as a guideline in
rendering their decision, not a bright-line rule.
Therefore, of the few courts that have addressed the issue of frozen
embryo disposition, the majority of them have held, with which the Model
Act is in accordance, under either the principles of contract or property law,
that the couple has initial authority over the frozen embryos to decide what
will be the proper disposition of the frozen embryos.
HI. DECISIONAL AuTHORITY REGARDING DISPOSITION
OF FROZEN EMBRYOS
Often when a frozen embryo is characterized as property, the
characterization does not connote tangible property or physical
possession."4 Rather, characterizing a frozen embryo as property relates to
who has the right to make decisions regarding the frozen embryos, such as
the embryo's "creation, storage, discard, donation, use in research, and
placement in a uterus." '165
162. Id.
163. See infra § IV.
164. Thomas, supra note 123, at 274.
165. John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L.
REV. 437, 454-55 (1990).
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Decisional authority is a "question of who owns or has a property
interest in early embryos."' 6 6 Therefore, just as other forms of personal and
real property can be contracted for, implicit in the decision regarding frozen
embryo disposition is that the disposition can be governed by a contract.'
6 7
There are a number of individuals or entities that can qualify as having
decisional authority over the frozen embryo, including, each gamete
provider separately or as a couple jointly, the physician who creates the
embryo, or the IVF program or embryo bank that has actual possession of
the frozen embryo.'68
"The assignment of property or decisional authority in external
embryos is independent of any particular view as to whether the fertilized
egg and early embryo are themselves rights-bearing entities or persons.
Whether viewed as an actual or potential person, the answer to the
ownership question is the same."'6 9 The couple that provided the gametes
to create the embryo has the strongest claim for decisional authority.
70
This ownership right stems from the gamete provider's original ownership
of his or her gametes and his or her decision to provide his or her gametes
for reproduction, gift, or examination. 17 1 If an individual's gametes are
taken without his or her consent, the individual may have a cause of action
for battery, and if the individual's gametes are already removed but are used
for other purposes, the individual may have a cause of action for
conversion. 17 Therefore, it follows that the individuals who combine their
gametes would have joint authority over the product that results from such
combination.
173
A. DIRECTIVES FOR DISPOSITION OF FROZEN EMBRYOS
"If the gamete providers have joint dispositional control of external
embryos, their power to give advance binding instructions for disposition of
their embryos should also be recognized."' 74 It is important for the gamete
providers to be able to control the disposition of the frozen embryos in
advance so there is certainty as to what will happen to the frozen embryos
should disputes arise later caused by "death, divorce, passage of time,
166. Id. at 454.
167. Thomas, supra note 123, at 275.
168. Robertson, supra note 165, at 455.
169. Id. at 456.
170. Id. at455-56.
171. Id. at 457.
172. Id.
173. Id. While the physician is essential to the creation of an embryo, the physician has been
hired for his or her skill, and absent an agreement, the physician's contribution does not make him
or her an owner of the finished product. Id. at 458.
174. Id. at 463-64.
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unavailability, or disagreement among the parties."' 75  Problems arise,
however, where one or both parties later disagrees with the advance
disposition and wants to change it.'76 There are arguments for'77 and
against'78 advance disposition, but problems may also arise when there is an
absence of a disposition agreement or the disposition agreement does not
cover all future contingencies.
There is a claim that when the dispute is between the couple and the
IVF program or embryo bank, the couple retains dispositional authority
over the frozen embryos because they have not waived or transferred any
authority that initially resided with them.'79 Therefore, under this analysis,
the IVF program or the embryo bank would not have any right to determine
what happens to the frozen embryos because the couple has not given them
any authority to make such decisions. 8°
However, when the dispute arises between the couple, there are
competing interests of the parties that need to be weighed; "one in avoiding
the financial and psychosocial burdens of parenthood, and the other in using
the embryos in question to become a parent."'' In weighing these
competing interests, there is a claim that the individual who is seeking to
avoid reproduction should prevail if the other individual has a reasonable
possibility of becoming a parent through alternative means.'82 This position
relies on the financial obligations that biological parents are required to
provide until the child attains the age of majority'83 and the psychological
effects it will have on the individual who did not want a child in knowing
that a biological child of his or hers exists. 84
It is argued that the competing interests should be judged according to
175. Id. at 463.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 464-65 (The arguments for recognizing advance agreements are that: (1) they
create certainty about the consequences of reproductive options, (2) parties gain from an ability to
rely on prior agreements when future contingencies occur, and (3) they minimize the number of
disputes and the costs resolving issues over the disposition of embryos).
178. Id. (The arguments against recognizing advance agreements are that: (1) an individual's
needs and interests may not be fully recognized as they would be should the future contingencies
occur, (2) an individual's needs and interests may change in ways that were unforeseen at the time
of the agreement, (3) preconception agreements to have or not have an abortion or to give a baby
up for adoption are not enforceable and therefore neither should preconception or preimplantation
agreements for the disposition of embryos, (4) there is no easy way to assure the individuals are
fully informed of the binding decisions they would be making, and (5) IVF programs and embryo
banks may have a monopoly power so that individuals are given little choice in the actual
disposition of their embryos).




183. Id. at 477-79.
184. Id. at 479.
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the harm that will result if one or the other interest is carried out. 85 "The
party who wishes to avoid offspring is irreversibly harmed if embryo
transfer and birth occur, for the burdens of unwanted parenthood cannot
then be avoided. On the other hand, frustrating the desire of the willing
partner to reproduce with particular embryos will - in most instances - not
prevent that partner from later reproducing with other embryos."'' 8 6 When
viewing embryos from the perspective of property, there is no reason to
prefer existing embryos over new ones.'87 If the individual's purpose is to
have the opportunity to reproduce, it should not matter if existing frozen
embryos or ones created in the future are used to achieve the reproductive
purpose.'88
However, this resolution of the competing interests is only appropriate
when the individual who wants to reproduce has other reasonable options of
reproduction.' 89 When there are no other available means for the individual
to reproduce, the individual's reproductive interest becomes stronger
because "the pleasures of parenthood will be deeper and more intense than
the discomfort of unwanted biologic offspring."'9 °
Therefore, decisional authority rests properly with the couple and the
frozen embryos should be considered the couple's property. However,
often couples do not enter into dispositional agreements with the 1VF
clinics or are not able to be found later, leaving unclear indications of their
wishes or insufficient funds to pay for the storage of the frozen embryos. 9'
In addition, while agreements between the couple and the IVF clinic may
provide for proper disposition for some future contingencies, unforeseen
contingencies may arise.'92 When such events occur, courts should look to
the principles of property law to resolve such matters.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW THAT SHOULD
GOVERN DISPOSmON OF FROZEN EMBRYOS
Since embryos can be properly characterized as property of a couple, as
seen through the analysis in Moore and York, in the absence of a state or
federal statute regulating the disposition of frozen embryos, common law
185. Id. at 480.
186. Id.
187. Id. "[T]he embryos at issue should be treated as fungible, because other embryos formed
from the [individual's] gametes would satisfy the partner's reproductive interests without
infringing on the unwilling [individual's] interest in avoiding the burdens of genetic parenthood."
Id. at 480 n.107. This stems from the proposition that life does not begin at conception and,




191. Forster, supra note 25, at 760-61.
192. Id. at 764.
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principles of property should apply.
A. BAILMENT
The best way to characterize the transfer and storage of the frozen
embryos to the IVF clinic and the dispositional agreement between the
couple and the IVF clinic is as a bailment relationship. Generally, any
personal property can be the subject of a bailment.193 Bailment is defined
as:
[a] delivery of goods or personal property by one person to another,
in trust for the execution of a special object upon or in relation to
such goods, beneficial either to the bailor or bailee or both, and
upon a contract, express or implied, to perform the trust and carry
out such object, and thereupon either to redeliver the goods to the
bailor or otherwise dispose of the same in conformity with the
purpose of the trust.
19 4
Bailment, therefore, consists of four elements: "(1) delivery of personal
property to accomplish some purpose; (2) retention of title by the deliveror;
(3) possession of the deliveree; and (4) disposition of the personal property
by the deliveree in accordance with the deliveror's instructions."'95  As
applied to frozen embryos, the couples' embryos are given to the IVF clinic
for the purpose of having an opportunity to reproduce. 9 6 As the creators of
the frozen embryos, the couple retains legal title to them but possession of
the frozen embryos exists with the IVF clinic. According to the
dispositional agreement, the 1VF clinic is under an obligation to dispose of
the frozen embryos according to the couples' instructions. Thus, a bailment
relationship exists when embryos are produced by a couple and
subsequently frozen for later use.
Courts recognize three different categories of bailments; one for the
benefit of the bailor, another for the benefit of the bailee, and the final
category for the benefit of both the bailor and the bailee.197 The disposition
of frozen embryos would involve the third category of bailments, benefit
for both parties. The benefit to the bailor couple would be the opportunity
to conceive a child, which without such means might not be possible. The
benefit to the bailee IVF clinic would be the financial gain realized in
performing the IVF procedure. In addition, a contingent benefit to the IVF
clinic and researchers is the possibility of the couple deciding to donate
193. Walter N. Kim, The Use of Common Law Bailments in Connection with the Licensing of
Living Organisms, 235 PRACTISING L. INST., PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 289, 303 (1987).
194. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 139 (4th ed. 1979).
195. Kim, supra note 193, at 308.
196. See supra §§ II, 111 (the embryos have already been established as personal property).
197. Kim, supra note 193, at 308.
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their unused frozen embryos for research purposes.
"To the extent not contrary to public policy, the rights and duties of the
bailee with respect to the bailed property may be defined by contract."'98
However, if no contract exists or if the contract in place fails to provide for
a contingency that occurs, "the bailee in a bailment for mutual benefit is
required to use ordinary care in protecting bailed property."'99 Should the
bailee use the bailed property in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the
bailor or not with ordinary care to protect the bailed property, the bailor
may have a cause of action in conversion.2
But if the rights and duties of the parties to the bailment are not defined
or are not properly defined, courts should apply common law property
principles to resolve any disputes that arise, including the principle of
abandonment.
B. ABANDONMENT
If the bailment contract between the couple and the IVF clinic is either
nonexistent or insufficient to provide for the disposition of the frozen
embryos, the question then becomes whether the common law principle of
abandonment can be applied to disposition of the frozen embryo.
Abandonment of property "is the voluntary relinquishment of 'all right,
claim, and possession, with the intention of terminating. . . ownership...
without vesting it in any other person and with the intention of not
reclaiming future possession or resuming its ownership, possession, or
enjoyment.""'2 °  For property to be considered abandoned, the intent to
abandon and the act of abandonment must occur simultaneously.2 2
Property will not be deemed abandoned if it is disposed of for
consideration, in which case it would be called a sale, or if it is disposed of
in favor of a certain person, in which case it would be a gift.203
Abandonment is not possible unless there is a vacancy in possession (i.e., a
time when no one is in possession of the property).2 °4
If no disposition agreement exists between the couple and the IVF
clinic, frozen embryos can be properly classified as abandoned. Ownership
of the frozen embryos remains with the couple until such ownership is
transferred. The absence of a disposition agreement fails to transfer the
ownership interest in the property to another individual. If the couple has
198. Id. at 309.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 315.
201. Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the
Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 243 (1986) (quoting I AM. JUR. 2D
Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 15 (1962)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 243-44.
204. Id. at 244.
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not exercised any of their rights over the frozen embryos for a period of
time, typically five years, it can be inferred that the couple has no intention
of using the frozen embryos in the future. Therefore, a presumption can
arise that the couple gave up their rights in the frozen embryos when they
initially transferred them to the IVF clinic. The IVF clinic thus would be
able to dispose of the abandoned frozen embryos or donate them for
research purposes.
When a couple executes a disposition agreement but fails to provide for
disposition in a particular occurrence, the question of whether the frozen
embryos are abandoned is less clear. No matter what disposition of the
frozen embryos the agreement provides for, the disposition will provide for
the ownership interest to either transfer to someone else or remain with the
couple. Therefore, the ownership interest would reside with an individual
or an entity, and this would negate the element of abandonment which
requires that the ownership interest not vest in anyone. Furthermore, the
couple would not have relinquished all ownership interest in the embryos at
transfer. It is not enough that there is a question as to ownership for the
contingency at issue to constitute abandonment. In addition, if the
disposition agreement provides for one of the individuals to have control of
the frozen embryos upon the occurrence of a contingency, it would show
intent of future use, thereby negating another element of abandonment.
Therefore, when a disposition agreement fails to provide for a contingency
that occurs, frozen embryos would not be considered abandoned. The court
instead should consider the intent of the parties in disposition of the frozen
embryos, based, in part, on how the couple provided for disposition in other
instances.205
Therefore, the IVF clinic's retention of a couple's frozen embryos
should be viewed as a bailment relationship when the couple has executed
an agreement regarding disposition of the frozen embryos. If no agreement
regarding disposition of the frozen embryos exists, the courts should apply
205. Prior case law has shown that when a dispute arises between a couple regarding the
disposition of their frozen embryos, courts have generally found in favor of destruction of the
embryo, even if neither of the individuals wants the embryos destroyed. See supra § I1. When an
embryo is properly classified as abandoned by both gamete providers, however, it does not matter
if the prior owners are in dispute about what should be done with the embryos because they are
not able to assert any ownership interests over the embryos. An argument is made that when one
gamete provider abandons the embryo, the individual who did not abandon the embryo should be
able to preserve the embryo because this is consistent with how the law resolves other property
disputes. See Laguna Development Co. v. McAlester Fuel Co., 572 P.2d 1252 (N.M. 1977). No
court has addressed the situation in which one gamete provider relinquishes all ownership interests
in the embryo while the other still retains an ownership interest. It would appear likely that a
court would find that the person who still retains an ownership interest in the embryo may dispose
of the embryo as he or she so chooses, whether this be to preserve the embryo or destroy it. When
a dispute between the gamete providers arises as to the disposition of the embryos, neither
individual having abandoned the embryo, the court should look to the individuals' intent to
resolve the dispute.
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the principle of abandonment since the frozen embryos can properly be
classified as property. However, classifying frozen embryos as property
and having the principles of property law govern the disposition of the
frozen embryos can raise ethical concerns.
V. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DONATING FROZEN
EMBRYOS FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH
Embryonic stem cell research has been the center of much debate since
the ability to isolate and culture embryonic stem cells was reported in
1998.06 Much of the debate reflects the holdings of the small number of
courts that have addressed the issue of frozen embryo disposition: whether
the embryo should be considered a person, therefore receiving all the same
protections given a human who is born; whether the embryo, while not a
human, should be given special consideration as a potential human; or
whether the embryo should be considered property. "Commentators hold
widely differing perspectives on the moral status of the human embryo.""2 7
One point of view taken by commentators is that the embryo is
considered a person from the moment of conception."0 8 This is the position
supported by the Catholic Church.
From the time that the ovum is fertilized, a new life is begun which
is neither that of the father nor of the mother; it is rather the life of a
new human being with his own growth. It would never be made
human if it were not human already. . . . [Genetic science] has
demonstrated that, from the first instant, the programme is fixed as
to what this living being will be: a man, this individual-man with
his characteristic aspects already well determined. Right from
fertilization is begun the adventure of a human life, and each of its
great capacities requires time . . . to find its place and to be in a
position to act.20 9
Since the Catholic Church believes that an embryo is a person from the
moment of conception, it follows that the embryo should be given all the
rights of being a human being, specifically the right to life.21 °
206. Ethics Committee, American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Donating Spare
Embryos for Embryonic Stem-cell Research, 78 FERTILITY & STERILITY No. 5, 957, 957 (2002)
[hereinafter Donating Spare Embryos] (released Nov. 2002, reviewed Jan. 2004).
207. Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable
Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 66 (1999). While there are
other reasons for and against conducting embryonic stem cell research, such as relieving suffering
and freedom to conduct research, this paper focuses on an embryo and its rights and/or third
parties rights to it.
208. Id.
209. SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON
PROCURED ABORTION, 12-13 (1974).
210. SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT
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Therefore, according to the Catholic Church, "[r]espect for the dignity
of the human being excludes all experimental manipulation or exploitation
of the human embryo."21' There is no purpose, no matter how dignified,
such as advantages to other human beings or society as a whole, which in
any way justifies the experimentation on living human embryos. 212
Additionally, the Catholic Church believes that it is not possible for the
couple that provided the gametes to give consent for the use of the embryo,
as is now required by most IVF clinics, because those individuals do not
have the power to dispose of the physical integrity or life of an unborn
child.2" 3 Most commentators who also believe that life begins at the
moment of conception are in accordance with the Catholic Churches' view
on frozen embryos use for research.214
On the other hand, some commentators take the position that the human
embryo is neither person nor property, but rather, should be afforded special
respect because the embryos have a heightened moral status.215  These
commentators do not believe that an embryo should be afforded the status
of a human being, in part because the embryo "is not sentient, lacks a brain,
and does not yet have even the rudiments of a nervous system. 21 6 The
embryos are given special respect, therefore, out of a concern for human
dignity and human life in general.1 7
In this respect, opposition is seen against any action that contributes to
the perception of the embryos as commodities.2"8 This would mean that the
purchase and sale of embryos, the creation of embryos for the specific
purpose of research, or the creation of embryos for inventory purposes
would be considered wrong. 219 However, destruction of embryos and their
use in some scientific research would be permissible.22°
Finally, a few commentators support the position that the embryo
should be considered property. According to this view, the embryo has no
FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION: REPLIES TO CERTAIN
QUESTIONS OF THE DAY (FEB. 22, 1987).
211. HOLY SEE, CHARTER OF THE RIGHTS OF THE FAMILY, art. 4(b) (Nov. 25, 1983).
212. SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, supra note 210.
213. Id.
214. Coleman, supra note 207, at 66.
215. Id. at 67.
216. John A Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of
the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 982 (1986).
217. Id.
218. Coleman, supra note 207, at 68.
219. Id. at 68-69.
220. Id. at 69. Many supporters of embryo research under this viewpoint believe that research
should be limited to the first 14 days of the embryo's development because the embryo has not yet
committed to being a single being, it may still divide or combine with other embryos to form a
single entity. Ethics Committee, American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Ethical
Considerations of Assisted Reproductive Technologies 62 FERTILITY & STERILITY Suppl. 1, S29-
30, S78 (1994).
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moral status and should be considered property of the couple that provided
the gametes to create the embryo. 22' The mere potential to become a born
human being should not carry with it any rights or duties.22 Otherwise, it is
argued that "an acorn should be treated as an actual, rather than a potential,
oak tree. '23 This line of reasoning is analogized to an egg and sperm that
separately have the potential to become a born human being, yet the egg
and sperm are treated as property.224
Of the commentators who support the view that regards an embryo as
property, many do not believe that the physical embryo itself should be
considered property, but rather believe that the right to make decisions
regarding the embryo's disposition is considered the property interest.225
"Given that gamete providers have rights to possess their embryos, to use
them and to donate them to or withhold them from others, it is hard to deny
that embryos constitute property. ' 226 Therefore, viewing an embryo as
property "would give the couple unfettered discretion over how their frozen
embryos are disposed,' 227 which could include the possibility of donating
the frozen embryos for stem cell research.
Proponents of embryonic stem cell research argue that "preimplantation
embryos will be discarded in any event and it is appropriate to gain some
benefit from the act. '228 The frozen embryos are said to be in a "terminal
situation" because the majority of the frozen embryos will not be adopted
and many of them may not even be viable if transferred to a woman's
uterus. 29 Considering the possible medical advances that can be achieved
through embryonic stem cell research, proponents of this research believe
they are morally obligated to pursue such research. In addition, they note
that frozen embryo donation for research is an extension of the couple's
authority over the disposition of the embryos.
Those in opposition of embryonic stem cell research "argue that
research causing the destruction of embryos is wrong" and that the same
benefits can be achieved through the use and further research in adult stem
cells.23" They believe that characterizing the frozen embryos as in a
221. Coleman, supra note 207, at 67.
222. John Dwight Ingram, In Vitro Fertilization: Problems and Solutions 98 DICK. L. REV.
67, 73 (1993).
223. Robertson, supra note 165, at 445.
224. Ingram, supra note 222, at 73.
225. Thomas, supra note 123, at 274.
226. Kermit Roosevelt, III, The Newest Property: Reproductive Technologies and the
Concept of Parenthood 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 87 (1998).
227. Coleman, supra note 207, at 67.
228. Donating Spare Embryos, supra note 206, at 958.
229. President's Council on Bioethics, Monitoring Stem Cell Research, January 2004,
http://bioethics.gov/reports/stemcell/pcbe-final-versionmonitoring-stem cell-research.pdf (last
visited March 16, 2007).
230. Donating Spare Embryos, supra note 206, at 958.
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"terminal situation" employs the use of circular reasoning.23" ' The embryos
are in a "terminal situation" because of an individual's decision, and thus
deciding they are going to die anyway and using them for stem cell research
ignores the original moral wrong in deciding to create and freeze them. 232
In addition, those in opposition to embryonic stem cell research believe that
the use of the frozen embryos for research will lead to treating frozen
embryos as commodities thereby diminishing the respect for embryos. 23
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine ("ASRM") takes the
position that an embryo is a potential human being that deserves special
respect.234 The ASRM supports embryo research if it is done in a way that
gives the embryo respect and if it is likely to provide significant new
knowledge that will be beneficial to human health.235  From this
perspective, the ASRM supports the use of embryonic stem cell research
only if the couple gives informed consent, since informed consent is the
foundation for all human subjects research.236
The couples' agreement with the IVF clinic typically provides for the
disposition of the frozen embryos according to the couple's wishes in the
event of divorce, death, or no contact with the clinic. 237 However, should
no divorce or death occur, the couple will need to decide the disposition of
the frozen embryos when their fertility needs are met or they wish to end
their reproductive efforts.238 It is only after the couple makes a decision that
they are no longer in need of the frozen embryos that the ASRM believes it
is appropriate for the couple to make a decision regarding donating the
frozen embryos for research. 239 This, the ASRM believes, will relieve the
pressure put on the couple to donate them for research.240
In order to successfully obtain a couples' informed consent to donate
their frozen embryos for research, the ASRM specifies basic information
the couple should be given.
Couples... should be told of the risks and benefits of donation[,]
. . . the purpose and nature of the research and of whether the
research is expected to have commercial value. They should [also]
be told that they may change their minds about donation at any time
until the experiment begins, that their status in the infertility
program will not be affected if they do not donate spare embryos,
231. President's Council on Bioethics, supra note 229, at 86.
232. Id.
233. Donating Spare Embryos, supra note 206, at 958.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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and that no embryos used in the study will be transferred for
pregnancy.241
The ASRM also states that further information should be given to the
couple if the research that is to be done on the frozen embryos is stem cell
research.242 Couples should be told that embryonic stem cell research
"typically involves deriving cells from the inner cell mass of an embryo at
the blastocyst stage, which leads to the embryo's destruction.2 43
Furthermore, the couple should be told there is a possibility that the cell line
might exist indefinitely, that the stem cells from the frozen embryos may
have commercial value of which they would not receive any benefit from,
and, if possible, the couple should be told of the anticipated research (such
as reproductive research, disease therapy development, or product
development). 24
In situations where a couple cannot be reached, the ASRM believes it is
appropriate to classify the frozen embryos as abandoned if the clinic has
"taken diligent steps to contact the couple, no written instructions exist, and
more than five years [has] elapsed without contact with the couple. 245
However, the ASRM believes that the only appropriate disposition for the
abandoned frozen embryos is to discard them; they are not to be used for
research or donated to another couple without prior consent. 46
Furthermore, if the couple that cannot be reached stated that the appropriate
disposition for the frozen embryos was donation for research, the frozen
embryos can only be used for stem cell research if the couple was informed
that embryonic stem cell research was a possibility when the clinic obtained
their informed consent.247
To lessen the uncertainty of when frozen embryos can be considered
abandoned and what should be done with them if they are, the ASRM states
that 1VF clinics "should require each couple contemplating embryo storage
to give written instructions concerning disposition of [the] embryos in the
case of death, divorce, separation, failure to pay storage charges, inability to
agree on disposition in the future, or lack of contact with the program. "248
In addition, the agreement should clearly state that the clinic has the right to
dispose of the frozen embryos if there has been no contact between the
couple and the clinic for a specified period (typically five years) and the
241. Id. at 958.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 958-59.
245. Id. at 959.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Ethics Committee, American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Disposition of
Abandoned Embryos, 67 FERTILITY & STERILITY Suppl. 1, S253 (1997) (released 1997, reviewed
Jan. 2004).
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couple has not updated the clinic with their current address and phone
number.
Therefore, there are many conflicting ethical considerations that may
influence, consciously or subconsciously, the courts or the state and federal
government's holdings and statutes regarding disposition of frozen
embryos. These ranging ethical considerations will most likely make
statutory resolution of this issue difficult. Accordingly, the common law
principles of property are appropriate to apply.
VI. CONCLUSION
"Deep within drab metal storage tanks, in fertility clinics throughout the
world, are hundreds of thousands of embryos. They're suspended in tiny
glass straws, frozen in liquid nitrogen - essentially in limbo, awaiting
decisions that will bring them to life or see them destroyed. ' 24 9 The reason
many of these frozen embryos are in limbo is because questions
surrounding whether they should be classified as persons, property, or some
special interim category, still exist.
Under our existing legal framework, and in the absence of a statute that
mandates otherwise, frozen embryos can be properly classified as property.
The question of whether individuals have a property right in their body
parts, when applied to embryos, can be answered in the affirmative under
the California Supreme Court's reasoning in Moore."' Therefore, since a
property right exists in embryos, the providers of the gametes who created
the embryo hold the rights that accompany the ownership of the embryo.
As owners of the embryo, the couple, jointly, possesses the right to
dispose of the embryo as they so choose. This is most often done through a
contract entered into with the IVF clinic, creating a bailment relationship
between the parties. However, if no bailment relationship exists between
the couple and the IVF clinic, after a reasonable period of time, typically
five years, the frozen embryo can properly be considered abandoned. As
abandoned property, an individual, or in the case of an IVF clinic, an entity,
has the option of claiming the property and asserting ownership over it.
The new owner of the property would then have all the rights of the original
owner and would, therefore, be able to dispose of the property as he, she, or
it desired.
There are many reasons, for and against, an IVF clinic donating the
abandoned frozen embryos for embryonic stem cell research. Since the IVF
clinic is the owner of the property and has the ultimate decision regarding
249. Vida Foubister, Extra Embryos: What is Their Future?, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS,
Nov. 13, 2000, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2000/1 1/13/prsal 11 3.htm (last visited Apr. 4,
2005).
250. Moore, 793 P.2d 479.
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the disposition of the frozen embryos, it will need to weigh the costs and
benefits for itself and reach a decision that it feels is most suitable with its
mission and operation.
Until legislation is provided directing the disposition of frozen
embryos, courts and IVF clinics will continue to differ on the proper
disposition of frozen embryos. Enacting legislation would most likely
require that a determination regarding the moral status of an embryo be
made, and with the continued debate surrounding the issue, it is apparent
why there has been difficulty in passing any legislation and will continue to
be so in the future. Until such time, courts should look to the common law
principles of property law when deciding issues surrounding the disposition
of frozen embryos.
